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 Changing ownership structures in the water supply and 
sanitation sector 
 
The development over time of the water supply and sanitation sectors in four countries is analysed to reveal the 
changing role of the private sector. In some cases, local small-scale private water supply and sanitation systems 
have been able to develop progressively into large-scale official systems, which may later be privatised. In other 
cases, foreign capital has been more significant in the development of modern water supply and sanitation 
systems, particularly where privatisation has occurred much earlier in the national development process. In 
much of the developing world, domestic water supply and sanitation is dominated not by the official water 
supply and sanitation companies but by independent operators who function without subsidies but with 
enormous variability in terms of quality of service and prices offered. In general they are constrained, however, 
by the absence of appropriate institutional and legal frameworks, including the lack of independent regulatory 
authorities. There is a need, where appropriate, to continue to encourage large-scale private sector involvement 
in the official water supply sectors of the developing world. At the same time though, it is only by promoting 
policies that also further the development (where appropriate) of the independent water supply and sanitation 
providers that access to water supply and sanitation services can be maximised since better use of local 
resources in many developing countries, both local human resources and capital, provide a key means for 
improving access to water supply and sanitation. 
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Introduction 
 
Eighty-two per cent of the population of the world, or 4.9 billion people, have access to basic 
safe water supplies, and only 60 per cent, or 3.6 billion people, have access to basic sanitation 
facilities (WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation, 
2000). While approximately 816 million additional people gained access to water supply 
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services and 747 million to sanitation services between 1990 and 2000, the percentage 
increase in coverage was modest against the background of rapid global population growth 
over the same period. The nature of the problem is compounded by the fact that there is 
significant population growth, particularly in urban areas, while there has been a tendency 
towards under-investment in the infrastructure needed for water provision (Sinclair, 2000, 
p355).  
 
At the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 a target was set to halve the proportion of 
people without access to safe drinking water as part of the Millennium Development Goals. 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg this target was extended 
to also include halving the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation (United 
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, 2002, paragraph 7). With global 
population likely to exceed 7 billion people by 2015 (United Nations Population Division, 
2002), this commitment will pose formidable challenges since it involves not only 
maintaining existing levels of supply, but also providing new or upgraded water services to 
approximately 1.7 billion and sanitation access to a further 2.1 billion people. 
 
In recent years there has been a growing trend towards privatisation of publicly owned water 
supply and sanitation services in much of the world. There has been a shift away from seeing 
water as a public good that is essential for life with subsidies being required as part of an 
overall welfare system. Policies promoting geographic equalisation have lost favour as have 
policies basing water tariffs on rateable property values rather than metered water use 
(Bakker, 2001, p144). A more market orientated approach has been adopted where the state is 
still seen as being critical to ensuring that universal access to water supply and sanitation 
services are maintained but where market forces can be used to meet this aim (Haugton, 2002, 
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p793). In the West this shift has been led by the neo-liberalist drive to reduce state spending 
and taxes while simultaneously increasing investment in the water sector, while in the 
developing world the World Bank has promoted neo-liberal reforms in the water sector as a 
means to free up state expenditures for other social priorities, rather than as a means to reduce 
taxation (Haugton, 2002, p793). Some form of well regulated privatisation is now seen by 
many as providing the cheapest means of maintaining and extending water supply and 
sanitation systems at the least political cost, thus leading to a rapidly growing global market 
for private water management services (Haugton, 2002, p794).  
 
Motivations for privatisation of state owned industry sectors vary.  Parker (1998) notes that in 
addition to the belief that privatisation leads to efficiency gains, other motivations for 
privatisation have included the promotion of the national capital market, increasing stock 
market capitalisation, government financing to reduce debt, and as a means of attracting new 
investors or investment. To these rationales, Cook (1998) adds enhancing freedom of choice 
and weakening trade unions. Meek (1998, p100) argues that the goal of increasing efficiency 
through competition has not always been the primary goal of utility privatisation policies. 
 
Privatisation of government owned utilities was until recently more limited in developing 
countries than developed countries due to a variety of reasons. Reasons included the 
technically difficult nature of privatisation processes, unfavourable local economic 
conditions, opposition from powerful vested interests, and the mix of economic and non-
economic goals that many public enterprises fulfil that private enterprises were seen as 
unlikely to adopt (Young, 1995, p163). Economic difficulties together with pressure from 
multilateral financial institutions have led to major reassessments of the role that government 
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now plays in the delivery of services such as water supply and sanitation that were once 
considered to be the realm of government. 
 
This paper asks how the role of the private sector in the water and sanitation industry has 
changed over time and how it varies in different socio-economic and geographic contexts. 
This question is important for addressing how different ownership structures can be used to 
maximise development in the water and sanitation sector by revealing which ownership 
structures, if any, are most appropriate for a given setting. Therefore, development over time 
of the water and sanitation sector in a range of countries will be analysed to reveal the 
changing role of the private sector, as well as how the perceived role of the private sector in 
this area has changed.  
 
The four case studies chosen are all countries where some degree of privatisation of the water 
supply and sanitation sectors has been introduced, and hence there exists a significant body of 
literature reviewing what process occurred or is still occurring, the roles of the different 
actors, and the effects of the privatisation process. The countries studied are Britain, 
Argentina, Côte d’Ivoire and Israel. 
 
In the literature on water supply and sanitation sector a distinction is frequently drawn 
between formal (official) water supply systems and the water supply services provided by 
operators acting in a supplementary role to the formal system. The official water supply 
authorities frequently have monopoly rights to water supply services within their area of 
jurisdiction while the other operators frequently operate without any official legal sanction 
and in some cases illegally. Such independent operators are frequently described in negative 
terms by the literature. For example, a recent World Bank report on the water sector stated 
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that in “city after city in the developing world the unserved poor pay ten or more times the 
price for a liter of water than is paid by their fellow citizens who are served with formal 
supplies” (World Bank, 2002b, p6). However, more realistically, there is enormous variability 
in terms of quality of service and prices offered by independent water and sanitation providers 
(Solo, 1999, p122). As part of the question of how the role of the private sector in the water 
and sanitation industry has changed over time this paper seeks to examine the extent to which 
the distinction between official and independent water supply and sanitation providers is 
valid. 
 
Development of water supply and sanitation sector 
 
 England and Wales 
The water supply and sanitation sector in England and Wales has evolved through a series of 
stages over a very long period of time, beginning as a predominantly private run system and 
eventually returning to private control. During the nineteenth century the water and sanitation 
industry developed as a mixture of municipal and small private undertakings (Saal and Parker, 
2001, p64). According to Hassan (1998) arms length government regulation of the industry 
during mid-Victorian times was a failure, with many private water companies unwilling to 
expand their operations where profits were doubtful; government generally treated water 
supply as a natural monopoly. Because of the problems resulting from privately owned supply 
systems, municipal services increasingly began to dominate by the end of the nineteenth 
century (Hassan, 1998, p18). This was because private companies at that time lacked the 
resources to build water supply systems on the scale of those completed by municipalities, 
and local government had an advantage at this time in obtaining cheap finance (Hassan, 1998, 
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p19).  Effective sewage disposal developed more slowly than water supply systems over the 
course of the nineteenth century. 
 
Unlike other utilities such as electricity and gas, no national grid for either water or sewage 
services emerged but consolidation still occurred over time and there were some attempts at 
increasing regulation during the first half of the twentieth century (Hassan, 1998, Sawkins, 
2001, p190). Between the 1950s and 1970 the number of water undertakings in Britain fell 
from more than 1,000 to around 200, due to mergers (Hassan, 1998, p92). In 1974, however, 
the British government took control of what was still a fairly fragmented system and created 
ten regional water authorities that were given full responsibility for the entire water cycle 
within their catchment areas (Saal and Parker, 2001, p65). This was the culmination of 
attempts to establish the integrated management of water resources in England and Wales 
(Hassan, 1998, p126).  In addition, 29 private statutory companies were permitted to continue 
their operations of supplying water only, with sewage services in the areas they served to be 
supplied by the local regional water authority.  
 
According to Bakker (2001, p144) prior to the nationalisation of 1974, security of supply and 
public health were the priorities of water supply management. Public ownership and subsidies 
had been adopted as management principles at the beginning of the twentieth century, with 
water users expected to pay according to their ability to pay rather than the costs they imposed 
on the system (Bakker, 2001). Water was regarded as a strategic resource.  
 
The reorganisation of the water industry of 1974 moved the industry from consisting of a 
patchwork of local municipal systems to an industry functioning at the regional scale that was 
combined with a strong national framework for investment and research (While and 
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Haughton, 2001, p723). One of the drawbacks of the new structure was the difficulty of 
meeting new investment needs from central funding sources, placing the system under strain, 
particularly due to the public expenditure cuts of the 1970s and the need to renew 
deteriorating infrastructure (While and Haughton, 2001, p723). While many efficiency 
measures were introduced into the water industry throughout the 1980s, including job 
shedding and cost-benefit analysis for investment, it was privatisation that consolidated the 
earlier transformations and completed the reform process (Bakker, 2001, p144). 
 
In 1989 the regional water authorities were privatised and became publicly listed water and 
sewage companies and the 29 statutory water companies were transformed into normal public 
limited liability companies (Saal and Parker, 2001, p65). While privatisation was inline with 
neo-liberal policies that saw the state as a less efficient provider of services than private 
industry, it allowed the state to reduce its liabilities and level of direct control while 
facilitating new sources of investment and expertise (While and Haughton, 2001, p723). A 
new regulatory body was created as it was not felt appropriate to leave responsibility for 
regulating their own water quality with the new private companies, and the industry’s debt of 
£4.95 billion was written off (Saal and Parker, 2001, p65). Previously publicly owned utilities 
were floated intact on the stock market, creating large private monopolies organised at the 
catchment scale (Bakker, 2001, p145). 
 
There was a fundamental shift away from vertically integrated monopoly networks to new 
models of network management (Marvin, et al., 1999) and water supplies were opened up to 
limited cross border competition (Saal and Parker, 2001, p62). Comparative competition, 
however, was the primary means of introducing competition into the privatised water sector; 
the newly created regulator would monitor and publish the performance of individual 
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companies, using the performance of the most efficient companies to set the standards for 
other companies to follow (Sawkins, 2001).  
 
Water charges increased significantly in order to pay for the new investment required to meet 
higher European environmental standards and to pay for new infrastructure, with average bills 
increasing by as much as 50 percent with some companies (Marvin, et al., 1999, p118). Price 
rises since privatisation were well above inflation and are expected to continue rising with 
inflation (Bakker, 2001, p157). 
 
An overall assessment of the effects of privatisation on the water and sanitation systems of 
England and Wales produces mixed results. Saal and Parker (2001), for example, argue that 
although productivity growth occurred, averaged across the industry as a whole growth did 
not improve relative to pre-privatisation. Sawkins (2001, p213) argues that despite the 
reforms since privatisation the water industry in England and Wales remains highly regulated 
and difficult for new players to enter. Some of the less politically acceptable aspects of 
privatisation have been mitigated through government intervention (Bakker, 2001, p158). 
While initial consumer support for privatisation of water and sanitation services was low, as 
the industry has matured following privatisation, general acceptance of a privatised industry 
has slowly increased. In part this acceptance may be due to the fact that the privatisation of 
the industry is now fully established and unlikely to be changed in the foreseeable future. 
 
The benefits directly accruing to British consumers as a result of privatisation may have been 
modest, however, the privatisation of the industry has made the privatised water companies 
well placed to take advantage of the expanding global opportunities in the water and 
sanitation sectors. At the same time some British water and sanitation companies have merged 
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or been taken over by other global water corporations.  Thames Water, for example, merged 
in 2000 with RWE, a Germany based utilities company and is now responsible for the 
management of the company’s global water business (Thames Water, 2003). Only 13 million 
of Thames Water’s 69 million customers are located in the UK, meaning that the company 
has a significant global presence. 
 
Argentina 
Almost a third of Argentina’s population of 37 million is concentrated in Buenos Aires and its 
surrounding suburbs. The central core of the city, the Federal District, is surrounded by 30 
other districts (Hardoy and Schusterman, 2000, p64). Buenos Aires is located on the west 
bank of the Rio de la Plata River which supplies 92 percent of the city’s needs, with marginal 
water supply costs being very low (Alcazar, et al., 2001, p3). Water scarcity is not reflected in 
the tariffs paid by consumers in Buenos Aires due to the plentiful water supply available to 
the city, rather, tariffs reflect water treatments costs and the costs of managing the distribution 
network (Mazzucchelli, et al., 2001, p87). 
 
Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN) functioned from 1870 until 1980 as the national water 
and sanitation supplier of Argentina but in 1980 the jurisdiction of the company was limited 
to the city of Buenos Aires and the 13 surrounding districts (Conte Grand, 1998, p4). With the 
exception of Buenos Aires, water supply and sanitation was devolved to the provincial 
authorities (Nickson, 2001, p1). Expansion of OSN’s water network in Buenos Aires 
continued until the 1970s but expansion ended sharply in the 1980s due to a reduction in the 
company’s revenues, a lack of qualified personnel and low levels of investment (Conte 
Grand, 1998, p5). Investment by OSN was insufficient to even maintain existing assets, 
leading to deterioration of the system at this time (Alcazar, et al., 2001, p4). OSN lacked 
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separation from the rest of the public sector; it was not autonomous in its finances and the 
managers of OSN were responsible to the National Ministry of Economy and Public Works 
(Mazzucchelli, et al., 2001, p55). 
 
In 1989 Argentina embarked on a major period of economic reform during which nearly all 
publicly owned utilities were either sold or transferred to private sector management (Loftus 
and McDonald, 2001, p179). Major economic reform became politically feasible at this time 
because Argentina’s economic crisis encouraged co-operation after years of bitter political 
conflict (Alcazar, et al., 2001). In December 1992 Aguas Argentinas was awarded a 30 year 
concession to run Buenos Aires’ water and sanitation network, with the company taking 
control of the network in May 1993 (Alcazar, et al., 2001). Aguas Argentinas was a 
consortium formed by local and international groups, with Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, a 
French company, being the lead partner. The concession was awarded on the basis of the 
lowest tariff bid and included the requirement for the water supply and sanitation network 
coverage to be extended over the course of the concession, thus requiring substantial 
investment by the concessionaire. An independent regulatory agency was established by the 
government to monitor quality of service and ensure compliance with the contractual 
arrangements (Loftus and McDonald, 2001, p187).  
 
Despite a plentiful supply of raw water, only 70 percent of the population within the 
metropolitan area of Buenos Aires were connected to the water supply system and 58 percent 
to the sewage system prior to the concession being established (Alcazar, et al., 2001, p20). 
This low rate of connection resulted from the lack of investment by OSN (Mazzucchelli, et 
al., 2001, p 95). In the poorer suburban areas of the city connection rates were much lower 
than the overall metropolitan area where only 55 percent of the population were connected to 
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the water supply system and 35 percent to the sewage system (Zerah, 2001, p6). By 1997 
coverage of the water supply system had reached 83 percent of the population (Alcazar, et al., 
2001, p42).  At the end of 2000, an additional 1.98 million people were connected to the 
water supply network, up from 5.76 million at the start of the concession, and 1.16 million 
additional people were connected to the sewage network, up from 4.66 million (Aguas 
Argentinas, 2001, p11). In addition, the existing water and sanitation network was 
rehabilitated since much was on the verge of collapse (Mazzucchelli, et al., 2001, p106). 
 
 
Ninety-five percent of the population not connected to the official water supply network were 
dependent on shallow wells, a water source liable to pollution from the cesspools and septic 
tanks in widespread use in areas not connected to the sewage system (Alcazar, et al., 2001, 
p20). These wells represented a significant sunk investment on the part of their owners, thus 
many of the city’s residents who could afford the access charges for connecting to the 
expanded official water supply and sanitation network resented the fact that they were 
required to connect to the network because their existing water supply and sewage systems 
were now outlawed (Alcazar, et al., 2001, p20).  
 
Despite the network expansion carried out by Aguas Argentinas, the Buenos Aires water 
concession has had a number of difficulties, such as the privatised company finding the costs 
of connecting poorer districts of the city up to the water network being higher than originally 
expected and thus demanding that the contract be renegotiated, and rumours of corruption 
(Loftus and McDonald, 2001). These difficulties may be due, to some extent, to the fact that 
much of the information upon which the tender process was based was of poor quality 
(Alcazar, et al., 2001, p20). There have been a number of revisions to the initial concession 
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contract, the first being in 1994 when the concessionaire was permitted a 13.4 percent tariff 
increase, approximately half the initial tariff reduction introduced when the concession was 
awarded (Zerah, 2001, p5). As a result of further revisions agreed in 1997, which increased 
average monthly bills for existing network users and decreased bills for new users, 
fundamental changes were made to the concession contract which meant that the 
concessionaire would then be paid in advance for network expansion (Zerah, 2001, p6). This 
prepayment system thus gave the concessionaire an incentive to delay investment as long as 
possible (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). A weak regulator combined with an ambitious 
network expansion targets thus resulted what has been described by some commentators as a 
regulatory failure (Zerah, 2001, p6).  
 
There has been a significant amount written in the literature about the privatisation of Buenos 
Aires water and sanitation network. Alcazar et al (2001, p42) note that the network’s 
privatisation led to a significant increase in investment and rise in the percentage of the 
population connected, with this investment being largely financed through increased debt. 
They calculate that as a result of the concession, collectively consumers in Buenos Aires are 
better off by $US 1.33 billion, noting that this is a conservative estimate since certain benefits 
of privatisation were ignored in their calculations (Alcazar, et al., 2001, p51). Loftus and 
McDonald (2001), however, argue that the majority of the negative impacts of the concession 
have been felt by poorest neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires. Similarly Zerah (2001) concludes 
that the benefits of the Buenos Aires Concession accrued largely to the high and middle 
income users already connected at the time the contract was awarded with affordability of 
access for the poor being a key problem. Loftus and McDonald (2001) argue that although 
investment increased after the introduction of the concession, this investment was funded 
through higher surcharges and increased debt burdens, with the publicly owned water 
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authority likely to have been able to achieve similar results since these finance sources would 
also have been accessible to the publicly owned authority (Loftus and McDonald, 2001, 
p189). 
 
Many other provincial governments followed the example set by Argentina’s national 
government and also privatised their own water utilities (Conte Grand, 1998). For example, in 
1997 the Provincial government of Córdoba signed a 30 year concession with the Aguas 
Cordobesas, a private sector consortium headed by Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux (Nickson, 2001, 
p1). The Córdoba concession contract is for the water supply of the Municipality of Córdoba, 
an area with a population of 1.4 million people (Nickson, 2001). At the time of the concession 
83 percent of the population was connected to the official water supply network, with the 
concession contract requiring that coverage be increased to 97 percent by the end of the 
concession (Nickson, 2001, p1). A significant proportion of those not currently connected to 
the official water supply network were supplied by independent private providers who 
frequently sourced their water from local wells of low quality (Nickson, 2001, p1).  
 
Similar to Córdoba, in 1999 the Azurix Corporation obtained 30 year water and sanitation 
services concessions for two regions within the province of Buenos Aires which included the 
provincial capital of La Plata and the city of Bahia Blanca (KPMG, 2002).  
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire does not face scarcity of water resources, with only 0.17 percent of available 
resources currently being used to meet domestic and industrial demand (N'Gbo, 2001). 
In 1959, even before the independence of Côte d’Ivoire, an international tender was launched 
in order to select a private operator to run the water supply network of in the Côte d’Ivoire 
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capital Abidjan (Kerf, 2000, p5). Before that time, water supply services had been the 
responsibility of municipalities which suffered from a lack of technical and financial 
resources that hindered efficient network operation and expansion (Kerf, 2000), and only 18 
communities had formal water supply systems in place (N'Gbo, 2001, p192).  
 
The Abidjan tender was won by French company, SAUR, who formed a new company with 
majority Côte d’Ivoire ownership but SAUR control in order to comply with the conditions of 
the tender contract (Menard and Clarke, 2000, p3). The new company, Société de Distribution 
d’Eau de Côte d’Ivoire (SODECI) had its role in Abidjan reduced in 1967 when the 
government took responsibility for the investment in the system while leaving operation and 
maintenance with SODECI (Menard and Clarke, 2000). However, in 1974 due to SODECI’s 
success in Abidjan, its jurisdiction was expanded to include a fifteen year contract for the 
operation and maintenance of urban water supplies in all other Côte d’Ivoire cities (Menard 
and Clarke, 2000, p4). In parallel to this, management of the water sector in Côte d’Ivoire was 
transferred from municipalities to the central government, and a government agency was 
given ownership of assets, responsibility for investment, and management of the contact with 
SODECI (Kerf, 2000, p5, Menard and Clarke, 2000, p4). Finance in the water sector was 
given to an autonomous agency with borrowing power that received the difference between 
the water tariffs charged and SODECI’s operator fees (Kerf, 2000). As a result of SODECI’s 
jurisdiction being all urban areas in Côte d’Ivoire, profits earned in prosperous areas of 
Abidjan are used to subsidise operations in Côte d’Ivoire’s towns (Collignon and Vézina, 
2001).  
 
In the 1980s Côte d’Ivoire faced serious economic difficulties which caused investment in its 
urban water sector to cease by 1985 (Kerf, 2000, p5). This economic crisis led to the reform 
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of the sector, with the government transferring sector planning to SODECI while at the same 
time removing guaranteed revenues for the company where demand did not match forecasts 
following network extensions (Kerf, 2000, p7).  
 
There has been a lack of competition in the water sector in Côte d’Ivoire. Bidding has been 
eliminated for most investment and renewal of the concessionary contract in 1988 took place 
without bidding (Menard and Clarke, 2000, p41). Efficiency gains likely to result from 
competition are absent and, while SODECI performs well by regional standards but still has 
high prices compared to Latin American and Asia, it is difficult to assess whether water might 
be able to be provided at lower cost in Côte d’Ivoire (Menard and Clarke, 2000, p41). Sewage 
services have always been separate from water supply in Abidjan which may have hampered 
the success of the water supply system (Menard and Clarke, 2000, p9, 36).  
 
Today more than 400 localities are served by SODECI, and the number of connections to its 
networks has grown from 4,000 to 380,000 and serve a population of 6.5 million (Programme 
Solidarité Eau, 2002). There are currently more than 30,000 new connections per year and the 
key management positions in the company are all filled by Côte d’Ivoire nationals 
(Programme Solidarité Eau, 2002). Despite the urban population rising from 4.7 million in 
1990 to 6.9 million in 2000, the percentage of the urban Côte d’Ivoire population served by 
water supply networks increased from 89 to 90 percent, and water is generally available 24 
hours a day in urban areas (World Health Organisation, 2000). 
 
Despite the general success of SODECI in developing Abidjan’s water supply system, 22 
percent of households receive their water from independent providers or traditional sources 
(Collignon and Vézina, 2001, p5). This is a figure far lower than many African cities where as 
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much as 80 percent of the population may be dependent on such sources. Many of these 
independent providers operate with the sanction of SODECI; tank operators pay a fixed price 
for refilling their tanks from one of 500 public standpoints that SODECI controls around the 
city and then sell the water on to consumers, providing services such as home delivery (Solo, 
1999, p123). While prices charged per unit of water may be high compared to SODECI’s 
prices, such consumers don’t have to pay fixed costs (N'Gbo, 2001, p205). In addition to this, 
SODECI has installed commercial water connections to residents living in officially 
authorised neighbourhoods of Abidjan located adjacent to areas of unauthorised settlement, 
knowing that the water will be resold by unofficial water vendors into these settlements 
(Collignon and Vézina, 2001, p13).  Such water vendors frequently develop extensive piped 
distribution networks to facilitate this water resale (Collignon and Vézina, 2001, p13). 
 
Côte d’Ivoire is relatively unusual compared to most African countries, as generally 
privatisation is not yet widespread in the region. According to Estache and Kouassi (2002, p4) 
in the period 1995-97 only two of 21 water utilities in Africa that they assessed had private 
sector participation, with one of these being the SODECI in Côte d’Ivoire. However, due to 
low proportion of the population that is served by many African water utilities, unofficial 
private sector participation in the water supply and sanitation sector is widespread. For 
example, in Bamako, Mali, the official water utility serves only 16 percent of households, and 
only two percent of households receive municipal sanitation services; independent water 
supply and sanitation providers hold the rest of the market (Collignon and Vézina, 2001, p13). 
 
Israel 
The current internationally recognised borders of Israel and its surrounding states were only 
agreed upon by the former colonial powers of the region, France and Britain in the 1920s, and 
 17
the final borders between Israel and an emergent Palestinian state have yet to be agreed in a 
peace treaty.  
 
In the pre-state period water laws varied from village to village, having developed by custom 
during the Ottoman period and continuing during the British Mandate, which ended in 1948 
(Trottier, 1999). In this pre-state period, the Jewish community in Palestine undertook its own 
water network that linked the different Jewish settlements (Trottier, 1999). Because of the 
aridity of the land, water was seen by the Zionist movement as a potential impediment to 
settlement, hence the focus on developing water resources to permit settlement in the land 
(Feitelson, 2002, p299). The first large scale water project by the Zionist movement was built 
between 1935 and 1938 in the Jezreel valley in the north of the country by its newly 
established water company Mekorot (Sitton, 2000).  
 
Following Israeli independence in 1948, Mekorot became Israel’s government owned national 
water company. In 1959 a comprehensive water law was passed that did away with the private 
ownership of water throughout the country and placed all water resources under the direct 
control of the state and the state appointed Water Commissioner (Water Commission, 2002). 
In 1964 Israel’s National Water Carrier was completed, interconnecting the different water 
resources of the country and permitting the large-scale conveyance of water from the 
relatively humid north of the country to the arid south.  
 
At present Mekorot, as a government owned company, is responsible for managing the 
nation’s water resources, including the wholesale supply of water to urban communities and 
industrial users. The company supplies approximately two-thirds of the total water used in 
Israel, with the remainder coming from privately owned facilities (Ministry of National 
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Infrastructure, 2002). Water prices for the domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors differ 
from each other and are set centrally by the Ministers of National Infrastructures and Finance 
(Water Commission, 2002). Domestic and industrial users are supplied at full cost while 
agricultural water use in some areas is partially subsidised (Ministry of National 
Infrastructure, 2002). Municipalities are responsible for distributing water to individual 
domestic users.  
 
Israel is moving towards privatisation and institutional reform of its water sector since it is 
seen that this will encourage greater efficiency in the sector and more rational use of water 
(Ministry of National Infrastructure, 2002). It is anticipated that new water suppliers will be 
carved out of Mekorot, with Mekorot’s role then being limited to the operation of the National 
Water Carrier and its regional water supply schemes privatised (Ministry of National 
Infrastructure, 2002). Water prices will be determined by a market trading system and new 
water sources will be created by the building of desalination plants along the Mediterranean 
coast through private tenders. It is planned that municipalities will privatise the management 
of domestic water supply so that it will be carried out by independent profit-making 
companies (Ministry of National Infrastructure, 2002). Private tenders for the building and 
operation of major desalination plants along the Mediterranean coast have already been issued 
to Israeli and foreign companies (Israeli Ministry of Finance International Division, 2002). 
 
The water supply network in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority 
has some autonomy from the Israeli system. For example in the Gaza Strip where the majority 
of domestic water is supplied by municipalities, 70 to 80 percent of water is drawn from 
domestic wells and the rest comes from Israeli system (Trottier, 1999). Private operators 
independent of the municipal networks also exist. A private operator in the Jabalya Refugee 
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Camp (in the northern Gaza Strip), for example, has drilled his own well and developed a 
distribution network independent of the municipal systems (Trottier, 1999). In other areas, 
similar arrangements exist.  
 
In the southern West Bank where centralised piped supply systems are lacking, many villages 
depend upon water delivered by tanker truck. Approximately 150 Palestinian communities are 
without water distribution systems and must depend upon such sources for their water 
supplies, with the water sales persons sourcing their water from a variety of sources, including 
natural springs, official water network outlets, and private wells (Trottier, 1999, p122). While 
competition exists between water sales persons, informal local oligolopolies can exist which 
permit higher prices than would exist in a true free market situation. Due to the absence of 
regulation, water quality delivered by the water sales persons can vary considerably (Trottier, 
1999). 
 
Discussion 
It is clear from the case studies above that there is a lot of diversity in the water sector in 
terms of management structures, as would be expected given the range of political and social 
systems present together with the differences in environmental conditions that effect the water 
industry. Nonetheless the increasing global trend to move towards greater participation by the 
private sector in the water industry is clearly illustrated in these cases.  
 
In England and Wales the water sector moved from small scale private and municipal water 
and sewage services through to a fully nationalised system and then back to a privatised 
system. Unlike the small-scale private and municipal system of the mid-nineteenth century, 
this privatised system consisted of a relatively few very large-scale enterprises and thus bares 
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few similarities to the earlier system. Whereas government intervention was originally called 
for because of the inability of private capital to meet the scale of investment required in the 
water sector (Hassan, 1998, p19), it was partly government unwillingness to continue to meet 
the large investment needs of the sector that led to privatisation (Haugton, 2002, p793); 
ideological factors were also influential. Local (and foreign) capital by the time of 
privatisation in 1989 had acquired the ability to manage capital and investments of the scale 
required for the large scale water and sewage systems then in place that would have been 
unthinkable in the mid-nineteenth century prior to the increasing government intervention that 
occurred during the interim. Despite this, the privatised British water companies themselves 
have not been immune from foreign ownership despite their own ability to compete in global 
water markets. 
 
In Israel, as with England and Wales, as the Israeli government now moves towards the 
corporatisation and privatisation of the water and sanitation systems, local (and foreign) 
capital has also acquired the ability to manage capital and investments of the scale required 
which did not exist at the time the nationalised system was put in place. This ability of Israeli 
capital has been demonstrated by the recent franchise agreements signed by two consortia of 
Israeli companies to each build a desalination plant of 30 million cubic metres a year along 
Israel’s Mediterranean coast, following an international tender (Israeli Ministry of Finance 
International Division, 2002).   
 
In the case studies of Argentina and Côte d’Ivoire foreign capital interests played a much 
larger role in the privatisation processes, and particularly with the case of Côte d’Ivoire, 
privatisation occurred much earlier in the development process than occurred in England and 
Wales, or is now occurring in Israel. In Buenos Aires, five consortia pre-qualified for the 
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bidding process, including two French led consortia, a Spanish led consortium, and a British 
led consortium, thus the bidding process was dominated by foreign capital. The winning 
consortium, Aguas Argentinas, was majority foreign owned, although 37 percent of shares 
were held by Argentine companies and ten percent by workers in the water company 
(Alcazar, et al., 2001, p20).  
 
In the case of Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire a French company won the tender. However, because 
a condition of the tender specified that the operator had to be majority owned by Ivoirian 
shareholders, the winning company was initially 46 percent owned by the French company 
SAUR (World Bank, 1977 as cited byMenard and Clarke, 2000, p3). The Ivoirian government 
held a five percent share, individual Ivoirian investors 45 percent, and individual French 
investors four percent. Given that SAUR was by far the largest single investor, the dominance 
of SODECI by foreign capital was clear. However, the foreign domination of privatised water 
and sanitation services does not necessarily mean an absence of local control or participation. 
In SODECI the President, Managing Director, all Operations Directors, and virtually all 
Technical Directors are Côte d’Ivoire nationals (Programme Solidarité Eau, 2002). 
 
England and Wales, and Israel are considered to be developed high incomes countries by the 
World Bank (although the West Bank and Gaza are considered to be a lower-middle income 
developing economy) (World Bank, 2002a). Argentina and Côte d’Ivoire are both classed as 
severely indebted developing countries, Argentina as an upper-middle income country with a 
high level of human development, and Côte d’Ivoire as a low income country with a low level 
of human development (United Nations Development Programme, 2003, World Bank, 
2002a). Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (purchasing power parity), at the time that 
the case study countries began their privatisations of their water supply and sanitation sectors, 
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confirms that the classifications of the World Bank as remaining appropriate. In 2002 US 
dollar terms, Côte d’Ivoire had GDP per capita of $1366 in 1959, compared to $1490 in 2001 
(Maddison, 1995, United Nations Development Programme, 2003). Similarly, in Argentina 
GDP per capita has risen from $10565 to $11320 between 1992 and 2001, while in Britain, 
GDP per capita has risen from $22594 in 1989 to $24160 in 2001 when measured in 2002 US 
dollars (Maddison, 1995, United Nations Development Programme, 2003). Israel’s 
privatisation of its official water supply system has only just began. 
 
 It appears that in many less developed countries, local capital frequently lacks the resources 
or capacity to manage large-scale privatised networks, hence privatisation tends to lead to 
foreign investment and control. While this may raise questions of economic sovereignty in 
some countries, in itself it is not necessarily negative. 
 
In the case of developing countries, global institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, promote their agenda of developing an international free market 
via their funding programmes in individual countries (Laurie and Marvin, 1999).  The World 
Bank has been active in facilitating the commercialisation of public water utilities and the 
development of regulatory frameworks (Pitman, 2002, p25). For example, by the time the 
concession for Buenos Aires water and sanitation system was put in place in 1993 the World 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank had both been involved in the sector for several 
years and assisted with the overall implementation of the process (Loftus and McDonald, 
2001, p183). In its own assessment of its water strategy, the World Bank has acknowledged 
that getting the private sector to focus on the needs of the poor has been difficult when 
implementing privatisations in the water sector (Pitman, 2002). In particular, the urban 
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periphery poses a major challenge to both the public and private water sectors, where supply 
can be difficult and the commercial risks too high.  
 
In the case of Britain, it was the merger over time of small-scale local water or sanitation 
providers that produced the larger water companies, with the process being encouraged by the 
British government. In Palestine and later Israel what began as a relatively small private 
company eventually become the national water supply authority. In Argentina, but 
particularly in Côte d’Ivoire, independent water and sanitation providers still play a 
significant role in meeting the overall needs of the population.  
 
It does not make sense to draw a sharp division between official and unofficial providers, or 
perhaps more significantly, to ignore unofficial providers when considering the water supply 
and sanitation sector. Particularly as the Côte d’Ivoire case study began to illustrate, in much 
of the developing world, domestic water supply and sanitation is dominated not by the 
officially sanctioned water and sanitation companies but by independent, frequently small 
scale, operators who may hold more than 80 percent of the water supply market (Collignon 
and Vézina, 2001, p50).   
 
Collignon and Vézina (2001, p10) and Solo (1999, p123) note that independent operators 
deliver their services without any subsidies or monopolistic conditions, while official water 
and sanitation providers tend to focus upon the most profitable urban areas. Despite this, 
independent operators are expected to charge similar rates to those of the official providers. It 
is generally not a lack of equipment, appropriate technology or human resources that 
constrain independent operators, but rather the absence of an appropriate institutional and 
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legal framework, including the lack of an independent regulatory authority (Collignon and 
Vézina, 2001, p50).  
 
Conclusions 
 
If the challenge set at the World Summit on Sustainable Development at Johannesburg in 2002 
is to be met of halving by 2015 the proportion of people who are unable to reach or afford 
safe drinking water and the proportion of people who lack access to basic sanitation, then both 
the public and private sectors have major roles to play. Given the magnitude of the task at 
hand, innovative policy options need to be considered that maximise the contribution from all 
key players. This will include the continued development and expansion of large-scale water 
and sanitation schemes into regions of cities in the developing world where they are currently 
absent or inadequate. It will also need to include the development of policies that better 
ensure access by the poorer elements of society to large-scale city-wide schemes, whether 
they are provided by the public or private sectors, and local or foreign capital. This may be 
facilitated by greater service differentiation in order to better reflect variable household 
preferences and budgets (Johnstone and Wood, 2001, p48).   However, given the high 
proportion of people in many developing cities that are currently unserved by official water 
and sanitation systems and the fact that rapid population growth for the most part will 
continue, there is a need to develop policies that also further the development (where 
appropriate) of the independent water and sanitation providers, giving them a degree of policy 
importance in policy development that matches their existing importance in meeting water 
supply needs. By recognising and introducing a degree of regulation of the activities of 
independent water and sanitation providers consumers dependent on their services stand to 
benefit (Johnstone and Wood, 2001, p48). 
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International agencies should, where appropriate, continue to encourage private sector 
involvement in the official water sectors of the developing world. At the same time though, 
establishing suitable policy frameworks for independent water and sanitation providers that 
encourage investment and which lead to service improvements and cost reductions is equally 
important. Better use of local resources, both local human resources and capital, provide a key 
means for improving access to water and sanitation. In Britain it was the unregulated water 
industry of the nineteenth century made up of many small-scale independent and municipal 
suppliers that eventually developed into the globally active water companies of today. 
Similarly, in Palestine (later Israel), it was the small-scale water works of the Jewish 
community, rather than the Mandate government, that eventually developed into an efficient 
national system. Small scale and independent water and sanitation providers can have an 
important role to play in the development of a modern and efficient water sector. Maintaining 
a sharp distinction between independent providers and official government or privatised 
(frequently foreign controlled) water and sanitation networks is not helpful if targets of 
increasing access to water are to be met.  
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